We study a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, where a confidential message is sent from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver, in the presence of a helper and an eavesdropper. For this setting, we characterize the optimal secure generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF). The result reveals that, adding a helper can significantly increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel. The result is supported by a new converse and a new scheme. In the proposed scheme, the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific power level and direction. In this way, it minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. In the secure rate analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of information-theoretic secrecy dates back to Shannon's work of [1] in 1949. Since then, informationtheoretic secrecy has been investigated in varying communication channels, for example, the wiretap channels [2] - [4] , multiple access channels with confidential messages and wiretap multiple access channels [5] - [7] , the broadcast channels with confidential messages [8] , [9] , and the interference channels with confidential messages [8] , [10] - [21] . In those settings, the messages are transmitted over the channels with secrecy constraints, which often incur a penalty in capacity (cf. [7] , [8] , [11] - [13] , [16] , [19] , [20] ). One way to minimize the capacity penalty incurred by secrecy constraints is to add helper(s) into the channels (see, e.g., [11] , [16] - [18] , [21] - [24] ). Specifically, the work in [21] recently showed that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF), in a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel.
In this work, we focus on a secure communication over a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper. In this setting, a confidential message sent from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver needs to be secure from an eavesdropper, in the presence of a helper. The wiretap channel and its variations have been considered as the basic channels for the investigation of information-theoretic secrecy. For example, the wiretap channel with a helper can be considered as a specific case of an interference channel with only one confidential message. The insights gained from the former can be very helpful in understanding the fundamental limits of the latter. In the wiretap channel with M helpers, the works in Jinyuan [11], [22] showed that the secure degrees-of-freedom (DoF) is M M +1 for almost all channel gains. The result is derived under the assumption that perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitters. The work in [18] , [23] then showed that the same secure DoF of M M +1 is still achievable when the eavesdropper CSI is not available at the transmitters. Another work in [24] studied a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, where a single antenna is equipped at each of the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while multiple antennas are equipped at each of the helper and the eavesdropper. The result in [24] revealed that the secure DoF 1/2 is achievable irrespective of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper, as long as the number of antennas at the helper is the same as the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. In the setting of wiretap channel with a helper, the previous DoF results were generalized to the multiple-antenna scenario where multiple antennas are equipped at each node [16] , [25] . In all of those previous works in [11] , [16] , [18] , [22] - [25] , the authors considered the secure DoF performance of the channels. The DoF metric is a form of capacity approximation. Under the DoF metric, all the non-zero channel gains are treated equally strong, at the regime of high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). However, in the communication channels the capacity is usually affected by different channel strengths of different links. Therefore, it motivates us to go beyond the DoF metric and consider a better form of capacity approximation. GDoF metric is a generalization of DoF, which is able to capture the capacity behavior when different links have different channel strengths and is very helpful in understanding the capacity to within a constant gap (cf. [26] ). The work in [17] studied the secure GDoF and secure capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, as well as the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel, where channel gain from the first transmitter to the eavesdropper is the same as the channel gain from the second transmitter to the eavesdropper. Note that, the setting considered in [17] has symmetric channel gains at the wiretapper, which is different from our setting considered in this work. Also note that, the secure GDoF upper bound and the lower bound provided in [17] are not matched for a certain range of channel parameters. In this work, we seek to characterize the optimal secure GDoF of a wiretap channel with a helper.
Specifically, the main contribution of this work is the optimal secure GDoF characterization of a symmetric wiretap channel with a helper, for all the channel parameters. The result reveals that, adding a helper can significantly increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel (see Fig. 1 ). The result is supported by a new converse and a new scheme. The converse is derived for the wiretap channel with a helper under the general channel parameters, i.e., the converse holds for the symmetric and asymmetric channels. In the proposed scheme, the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific power level and direction. In this way, it minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. In the proposed scheme, the signal of the transmitter is a superposition of a common signal, middle signal, and a private signal. The power of private signal is low enough such that this signal arrives at the eavesdropper under the noise level. The power of the common signal and middle signal is above the noise level. However, each of the common signal and middle signal is aligned at a specific power level and direction with the jamming signal sent from the helper, which minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. The optimal secure GDoF is described in different expressions for different interference regimes. For each interference regime, the power and rate levels of the signals in the proposed scheme are set to the optimal values, so as to achieve the optimal secure GDoF. In the secure rate analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used (cf. [27] , [28] ). The secure GDoF result derived in this work can be extended to understand the secure capacity to within a constant gap, which will be investigated in the future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This work focuses on a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper (see Fig. 2 ). In this setting, transmitter 1 sends a confidential message to receiver 1 (the legitimate receiver), in the presence of a helper (transmitter 2) and an eavesdropper (receiver 2). The channel input-output relationship of this setting is described by
where y k (t) denotes the received signal of receiver k at time t, x k (t) denotes the transmitted signal of transmitter k with a normalized power constraint E|x k (t)| 2 ≤ 1, and z k (t) ∼ N (0, 1) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise. √ P α k h k represents the channel gain of the link from transmitter to receiver k, for , k = 1, 2. The nonnegative parameter α k captures the link strength of the channel from transmitter to receiver k. h k ∈ (1, 2] represents the channel coefficient after normalization. In this setting, P ≥ 1 captures the base of signal-to-noise ratio of all the links. Since the form of √ P α k h k can describe any real channel gain no less than 1, the above model can describe the general channels in terms of capacity approximation. In this setting, all the nodes are assumed to know all the channel parameters {α k , h k } k, . When we consider the symmetric case, we will assume that
In this setting, transmitter 1 sends a message w to its legitimate receiver over n channel uses, where w is chosen uniformly from the set W {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2 nR }. When transmitting the confidential message from transmitter 1, a stochastic function
where the randomness in this mapping is represented by w 0 ∈ W 0 . We assume that w 0 and w are independent. At the helper (transmitter 2), another function f 2 : W h → R n generates a random signal
is a random variable that is independent of w 0 and w. We assume that w 0 is available at the first transmitter only, while w h is available at the second transmitter only. We say a secure rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes with n-length, such that the legitimate receiver can reliably decode the message w, i.e., Pr[w =ŵ] ≤ for any > 0, and the message is secure from the eavesdropper, i.e., I(w; y n 2 ) ≤ n . We will use C to denote the secure capacity, which is defined as the maximal secure rate that is achievable. We will use d to denote the secure generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF), which is defined as d lim P →∞ C 1 2 log P . GDoF is a form of the approximation of capacity. In this setting, DoF is a particular case of GDoF by considering only one point with α 12 = α 21 = α 22 = α 11 = 1.
III. MAIN RESULT
This section provides the main result of this work. Theorem 1. Consider the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II. For almost all channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×2 , the optimal secure GDoF is characterized as
(2g) Proof. The converse follows from Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 described in Section IV. A sketch of the achievability scheme is provide in Sections V, with full details provided in [29] . Fig. 1 depicts the secure GDoF for the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channels with and without a helper. For the wiretap channel without a helper (removing transmitter 2), the secure GDoF, denoted by d no , is characterized as [29] for details). One can find that adding a helper significantly increases the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel.
IV. CONVERSE
For the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, we provide a general upper bound on the secure rate, which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, letting φ 1 (α 12 − (α 22 − α 21 ) + ) + and φ 3 min{α 21 , α 12 , (α 11 − φ 1 ) + }, the secure rate is upper bounded by
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in the following subsections. Based on Lemma 1, we provide the secure GDoF upper bound in the following corollary. Proof. According to Lemma 1, the secure GDoF is upper bounded by
The first bound d ≤ max{φ 1 , (α 11 − φ 3 ) + } + (φ 3 − φ 1 ) + follows from (3). The second and third bound follows from (4) and (5), respectively. Setting α 11 = α 22 = 1 and α 21 = α 12 = α, we obtain the desired result (readers may refer to Appendix E in [29] for details).
In what follows, we prove the bound (3) in Lemma 1, while the proofs of other bounds are provided in [29] . At first, for k, ∈ {1, 2}, k = we define that
wherez 1 (t),z 2 (t),z 2 (t),z 3 (t),z 4 (t) ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. noise random variables that are independent of the other noise random variables and transmitted signals {x
A. Proof of bound (3)
For the channel defined in Section II, the secure rate is bounded as follows: where (15) results from Fano's inequality and the secrecy constraint I(w; y n 2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small ; (16) uses the fact that adding information will not reduce the mutual information; (17) follows from the fact that w is independent of x n 2 and s n 22 (cf. (10)). Let us first focus on the term of I(w; y n 2 ) in (17) . From the definition in (14) , we note that w → y n 2 →ȳ n 2 forms a Markov chain. It implies that 
where (19) follows from the independence between w and s n 22 . For the term I(w; s n 22 |ȳ n 2 ) in (19) , it can be bounded by
≤ n 2 log 14 (22) where (20) follows from chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (21) results from the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy, and that conditioning reduces differential entropy. Then, by incorporating (19) and (22) into (17), it gives nR − n 2 log 14 − n 1,n − n ≤I(w; y n 1 |s n 22 ) − I(w;ȳ n 2 |s n 22 ) =h(y n 1 |s n 22 )−h(ȳ n 2 |s n 22 )+h(ȳ n 2 , s n 22 |w)−h(y n 1 , s n 22 |w) (23) where (23) uses the identities that h(ȳ n 2 |s n 22 , w) = h(ȳ n 2 , s n 22 |w) − h(s n 22 |w) and h(y n 1 |s n 22 , w) = h(y n 1 , s n 22 |w) − h(s n 22 |w).
Consider the first two terms in the right-hand side of (23). We have (24) uses the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (25) follows from the fact that z n 2 is independent of { √ P −φ3 h 21 x 1 (t)+ √ P α22−(α21−φ3) h 22 x 2 (t)+z 2 (t)} n t=1 and s n 22 = { √ P (α22−α21) + h 22 x 2 (t)+z 2 (t)} n t=1 ; in (26) we replacẽ z 2 (t) with a new noise random variable z 2 (t) ∼ N (0, 1) that is independent of the other noise random variables and transmitted signals {x 1 (t), x 2 (t)} t ; note that replacingz 2 (t) ∼ N (0, 1) with z 2 (t) ∼ N (0, 1) will not change the differential entropies in (25) , due to the fact that differential entropy depends on distributions. To bound the right-hand side of (26), we will use the result of [20, Lemma 9] that is described below.
, as defined in (1) . Consider a random variable (or a set of random variables),w 1 , that is independent of {x n 2 , z n 1 , z n 2 ,z n 1 ,z n 2 ,z n 2 ,z n 3 ,z n 4 }; and consider another random variable (or another set of random variables),w 2 , that is independent of {x n 1 , z n 1 , z n 2 ,z n 1 ,z n 2 ,z n 2 ,z n 3 ,z n 4 }. Then, we have h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) − n 2 log 10
h(y n 1 |w 2 ) − h(y n 2 |w 2 ) − n 2 log 10
Note that the result in (28) holds true whenw 2 is set asw 2 
Then, by incorporating the result of (28) into (26), we have h(y n 1 |s n 22 ) − h(ȳ n 2 |s n 22 ) − n 2 log 10 ≤h(y n 1 |w 2 ) − h(y n 2 |w 2 ) − n 2 log 10 (29)
where (29) is from (26) ; and (30) follows from (28) . For the last two terms in (23), we have an upper bound that is stated in the following lemma. Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A in [29] .
Finally, by incorporating (32) and (31) into (23), it gives the desired bound (3).
V. SKETCH OF ACHIEVABILITY
This section provides a sketch of the proposed cooperative jamming scheme for the channel defined in Section II. The proposed scheme uses the pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and signal alignment. Specifically, transmitter 1 sends the signal as (without time index for simplicity)
The helper sends a cooperative jamming signal as
The Table I we provide the parameters {β c , β m , β p , λ c , λ m , λ p } for some regimes (more details shown in [29] ). Given our signal design, 
the power constraints E|x 1 | 2 ≤ 1 and E|x 2 | 2 ≤ 1 are satisfied. Then, the received signals take the following forms As we can see, at the eavesdropper, the jamming signal u c (resp. u p ) is aligned at a specific power level and direction with the signal v c (resp. v m ). In this way, it will minimize the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. Note that, with the above parameter design, the power of signal term with v p is under the noise level at receiver 2, while the power of signal term with u p is under the noise level at receiver 1. For the proposed scheme, we prove that it achieves the optimal secure GDoF expressed in Theorem 1. The full details are provided in [29] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we characterized the optimal secure GDoF of a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper. The result reveals that, adding a helper can significantly increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel. A new converse and a new scheme are provided in this work. The converse derived in this work holds for the symmetric and asymmetric channels. In the proposed scheme, the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific power level and direction, which allows to minimize the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. In the secure rate analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used. In the future work, we will generalize our secure GDoF result to understand the constant-gap secure capacity.
